Abstract-We study the problem of collaboratively estimating the state of an LTI system monitored by a network of sensors (nodes), subject to the following important practical considerations: (i) certain sensors might be arbitrarily compromised by an adversary and (ii) the underlying communication graph governing the flow of information across sensors might be time-varying. We first analyze a scenario involving intermittent communication losses that preserve certain information flow patterns over bounded intervals of time. By equipping the sensors with adequate memory, we show that one can obtain a fully distributed, provably correct state estimation algorithm that accounts for arbitrary adversarial behavior, provided certain conditions are met by the network topology. We then argue that our approach can handle bounded communication delays as well. Next, we explore a case where each communication link stochastically drops packets based on an analog erasure channel model. For this setup, we propose state estimate update and information exchange rules, along with conditions on the network topology and packet drop probabilities, that guarantee mean-square stability despite arbitrary adversarial attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a scenario where a group of sensors deployed over a geographical network seek to cooperatively estimate the state of a dynamical process. This general setup constitutes the standard distributed state estimation problem and finds applications in various domains such as power systems, transportation networks, automated factories, and distributed robotics. As envisioned in [1] , to fully leverage the benefits of a distributed sensor network as described above, one must design algorithms and networks that can respond to dynamic environments involving unreliable components. In particular, the growing need for designing secure networked control systems necessitates the design of localized algorithms that operate reliably in the face of adversarial sensor attacks. In this context, unavoidable network-induced issues such as communication losses and delays offer additional degrees of freedom for adversaries to devise carefully crafted attacks, thereby significantly compounding the estimation problem. 1 In light of the above discussion, the design of attack-resilient, provably correct distributed state estimation algorithms that account for various types of communication losses and delays will be the subject of our present investigation.
Related Work: The classical distributed state estimation problem, as described above, has been studied extensively over the past decade; however, single-time-scale algorithms that solve such problems under the most general conditions on the system and network have been proposed only recently in [2] - [4] . While the problem of detecting and mitigating various forms of data-injection attacks in deterministic [5] - [7] and stochastic [8] centralized 2 systems is now well understood, tackling adversarial behavior in the context of distributed state estimation remains largely unexplored. The limited literature that seeks to address this problem either provides no theoretical guarantees [9] , [10] or limits the class of admissible attacks [11] . In an initial effort to bridge the gap between centralized and distributed secure state estimation, we recently developed a distributed observer that allows each non-compromised sensor to asymptotically recover the entire state dynamics despite arbitrary adversarial sensor attacks, under appropriate conditions on the network topology [12] . However, our proposed technique did not account for the challenges introduced by communication drop-outs or delays. This leads us to the contributions of the present paper.
Contributions: Our contributions are twofold. First, in Section IV, we consider a communication loss model where certain information flow patterns are preserved deterministically over bounded intervals of time. For this communication loss model, we show how sensors equipped with memory can process delayed state estimates received from neighbors (some of whom can be potentially adversarial) to asymptotically estimate the state of the system. Our algorithm is inspired by recent work that addresses the resilient consensus problem in asynchronous settings [13] , [14] . As a byproduct of our analysis, we argue that the proposed strategy accounts for bounded communication delays as well. We also characterize the convergence time of our algorithm in terms of the system instability, the upper bound on the delay, and certain properties of the underlying communication graph. The second main result of the paper, presented in Section VI, pertains to a network whose communication links are modeled as analog erasure channels that may or may not introduce random delays. We show how a graph metric known as 'strong-robustness' (introduced in our prior work [12] ) can help tolerate higher erasure probabilities, while guaranteeing mean-square stability of the estimation error dynamics. Finally, we emphasize that all our results apply to a sophisticated and worst-case adversarial model (termed Byzantine adversaries) which is typically considered in the literature on resilient distributed algorithms [15] - [18] .
II. SYSTEM AND ATTACK MODEL Notation: A directed graph is denoted by G = (V, E), where V = {1, · · · , N } is the set of nodes and E ⊆ V × V represents the edges. An edge from node j to node i, denoted by (j, i), implies that node j can transmit information to node i. The neighborhood of the i-th node is defined as N i {j | (j, i) ∈ E}. The notation |V| is used to denote the cardinality of a set V. Throughout the rest of this paper, we use the terms 'edges' and 'communication links/channels' interchangeably. The set of all eigenvalues (modes) of a matrix A is denoted by sp(A) = {λ ∈ C | det(A−λI) = 0} and the set of all marginally stable and unstable eigenvalues of A is denoted by Λ U (A) = {λ ∈ sp(A) | |λ| ≥ 1}. We use diag(A 1 , · · · , A 2 ) to refer to a block-diagonal matrix with the matrix A i as the i-th block entry. The notation I r is used to denote an identity matrix of dimension r. The notation Z ≥0 is used to denote the set of all non-negative integers, and for a random variable X, its expected value is denoted by E[X].
System Model: Consider the linear dynamical system
where k ∈ Z ≥0 is the discrete-time index, x[k] ∈ R n is the state vector and A ∈ R n×n is the system matrix. The system is monitored by a network G = (V, E) consisting of N nodes. The i-th node has partial measurement of the state
where
T , and
In the standard distributed state estimation problem, each node is required to estimate the state x[k] using its own measurements and the information received from its neighbors, where such information flow is restricted by the underlying communication graph G. A challenging scenario emerges when one seeks to solve the same problem in the presence of malicious nodes in the network. We now formally describe the adversary model considered throughout the paper.
Adversary Model: We consider a subset A ⊂ V of the nodes in the network to be adversarial. We assume that the adversarial nodes are completely aware of the network topology (and any variations to such topology due to communication drop-outs), the system dynamics and the algorithm employed by the non-adversarial nodes. In terms of capabilities, an adversarial node can leverage the aforementioned information to arbitrarily deviate from the rules of any prescribed algorithm, while colluding with other adversaries in the process. Furthermore, following the Byzantine fault model [19] , adversaries are allowed to send differing state estimates to different neighbors at the same instant of time. This assumption of omniscient adversarial behavior is standard in the literature on resilient and secure distributed algorithms [15] - [18] , and allows us to provide guarantees against "worst-case" adversarial behavior. In terms of their density in the network, we assume that there are at most f adversarial nodes in the neighborhood of any non-adversarial node; this property will be referred to as the 'f -local' property of the adversarial set. Summarily, the adversary model described thus far will be called an f -local Byzantine adversary model. The non-adversarial nodes will be referred to as regular nodes and be represented by the set R = V \ A. Finally, note that the number and identities of the adversarial nodes are not known to the regular nodes.
Objective: Given the LTI system (1), the measurement model (2), a communication graph G, and the f -local Byzantine adversary model described above, our objective in this paper is to design state estimate update and information exchange rules that guarantee asymptotic convergence (in a deterministic or stochastic sense) of the estimates of the regular nodes to the true state of the plant, under different types of communication loss models.
Proofs of all our technical results are omitted due to space constraints, and can be found in [20] .
III. PRELIMINARIES
Before developing our estimation strategy, we first establish certain terminology, notation, and key ideas in this section. To begin with, the underlying communication graph G that dictates the flow of information among nodes in the absence of any communication losses will be referred to as the baseline communication graph. The loss of communication between nodes is modeled by a time-varying graph (1), we make the following assumption for clarity of exposition. 
Commensurate with this decomposition, the j-th component of the state vector z[k] will be denoted by z (j) [k], and will be referred to as the component corresponding to the eigenvalue λ j . Since recovering z[k] is equivalent to recovering x[k], we focus on estimating z [k] . To this end, we will use the following definition of source nodes.
Definition 1. (Source nodes)
For each λ j ∈ Λ U (A), let the set S j be defined as follows:
Then S j will be called the set of source nodes for λ j .
Let Ω U (A) ⊆ Λ U (A) contain the set of eigenvalues of A for which V \ S j is non-empty. Then, for each λ j ∈ Ω U (A), Fig. 1 . A scalar unstable plant is monitored by a clique of N + 2 nodes, where s 1 and s 2 are the only source nodes. A single adversary corrupting either of the two sources can render the distributed state estimation problem impossible, irrespective of the choice of algorithm. Specifically, the adversary can behave in a way that makes it impossible for the non-source nodes to distinguish between two different state trajectories of the system, due to the conflicting information from the two source nodes. See [21] for details.
our strategy requires the source nodes S j to maintain local 5 Luenberger observers for estimating z (j) [k] , while the nonsource nodes rely on a secure consensus protocol to achieve this task. For any node i, let the set of eigenvalues it can detect be denoted by O i , and let UO i = sp(A) \ O i . Then, the following result from [12] states that node i can estimate the locally detectable portion of z[k], referred to as z Oi [k], without interacting with its neighbors. Lemma 1. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, for each regular node i ∈ R and each λ j ∈ O i , a local Luenberger observer can be constructed that ensures that lim k→∞ |ẑ
maintained by node i. The real challenge is posed by the task of estimating the locally undetectable dynamics, since it necessitates communicating with neighbors, some of whom might be adversarial. In fact, the traditional metric of graph connectivity which plays a pivotal role in the analysis of fault-tolerant and secure distributed algorithms [22] , [23] , cannot capture the requirements to be met by a sensor network for addressing adversarial behavior in the context of distributed state estimation. A simple illustration of this fact is depicted in Figure  1 . The illustration alludes to the need for a certain amount of redundancy in the measurement structure and the network topology. To this end, in [12] , we proposed an algorithm that made use of certain directed acyclic subgraphs in addressing the secure distributed estimation problem; properties of such subgraphs are described below.
Definition 2. (Mode Estimation Directed Acyclic Graph (MEDAG))
Consider an eigenvalue λ j ∈ Ω U (A). Suppose there exists a spanning subgraph G j = (V, E j ) of G with the following properties for all f -local sets A and R = V \ A.
(ii) There exists a partition of R into the sets {L
(where 1 ≤ q ≤ T j ), 5 Here, by 'local' we imply that such observers can be constructed and run without any information from neighbors.
It should be noted that T j and the levels L m "belongs to level m", where the levels indicate the distances of the regular nodes from the source set S j . Intuitively, to counter the actions of the adversaries, one requires a secure medium of information flow from the source nodes S j to the non-source nodes V \ S j , that prevents the adversaries from acting as bottlenecks between such nodes. This in turn necessitates redundant nodes and edges. A MEDAG G j is a subgraph with properties that match such redundancy requirements. Specifically, the first property of a MEDAG indicates that every regular node i ∈ V \ S j has at least (2f + 1) neighbors in the subgraph G j , while the second property indicates that all its regular neighbors in such a subgraph belong to levels strictly preceding its own level. Our estimation scheme (described later) relies on a special information flow pattern that requires a node i to listen to only its neighbors in N . Before proceeding further, we need to understand the properties of the baseline communication graph G that guarantee the existence of a MEDAG G j , ∀λ j ∈ Ω U (A). To this end, we require the following definitions and result from [12] .
Definition 3. (r-reachable set) For a graph G = (V, E), a set S ⊂ V, and an integer r ∈ Z >0 , S is an r-reachable set if there exists an i ∈ S such that |N i \ S| ≥ r.
Definition 4.
(strongly r-robust graph w.r.t. S j ) For r ∈ Z >0 and λ j ∈ Ω U (A), a graph G = (V, E) is strongly r-robust w.r.t. to the set of source nodes S j , if for any nonempty subset C ⊆ V \ S j , C is r-reachable.
Given a λ j ∈ Ω U (A), there might be more than one subgraph that satisfies the definition of a MEDAG G j . In [12] , we proposed a distributed algorithm that allowed each node i to identify the sets N (j) i , ∀λ j ∈ U O i , by explicitly constructing a specific MEDAG G j for each λ j ∈ UO i . In this paper, we assume that these MEDAGs have already been constructed during a distributed design phase using such an algorithm, to inform each node i of the set N (j) i , ∀λ j ∈ UO i . It will be important to keep in mind that the sets N (j) i are time-invariant as they correspond to specific MEDAGs in the baseline graph (although node i may not be connected to all of the nodes in N (j) i at any given time-step).
IV. SECURE STATE ESTIMATION OVER TIME-VARYING NETWORKS
In this section, we develop an algorithm that enables each regular node to estimate its locally undetectable portion of the state subject to arbitrary adversarial attacks and intermittent communication losses that satisfy the following criterion.
Assumption 2. There exists
Note that under the above communication failure model, G[k] may not contain the specific MEDAGs constructed during the design phase for some (or all) k, thereby precluding direct use of the technique developed in [12] . However, such MEDAGs will be preserved in the union graph over the interval [k − T, k], ∀k ≥ T . For this model, we assume that all estimates being transmitted by regular nodes are properly time-stamped, and propose the following algorithm.
For each λ j ∈ UO i , a regular node i updates its estimate of z 
Prior to receiving the first estimate from a node l ∈ N (j) i , the valuez
is maintained at 0 by node i. 2) The valuesz
are sorted from largest to smallest; subsequently, the largest f and the smallest f of such values are discarded (i.e., 2f values are discarded in all) andẑ
represents the set of nodes whose (potentially) delayed estimates are used by node i at time-step k after the removal of the 2f aforementioned values. Node i assigns the consensus weight w 
We refer to the above algorithm as the Sliding Window Local-Filtering based Secure Estimation (SW-LFSE) algorithm. We comment on certain features of this algorithm and then proceed to analyze its convergence properties.
Remark 1.
Like the LFSE algorithm in [12] , the SW-LFSE algorithm also relies on a two-stage filtering strategy. Specifically, the first stage of filtering corresponds to a regular node i ∈ V \ S j listening to only its neighbors N 
discard certain extreme values received from nodes in N (j) i . A key point of difference between the algorithms is that in the SW-LFSE approach, at each time-step k, node i needs to store the most recent (potentially) delayed estimate received from each neighbor in N (j) i . Consequently, we require the regular nodes to possess adequate memory.
Remark 2. Our approach does not require the nodes to have a priori knowledge of the value of T in Assumption 2.
Remark 3. Our results will continue to hold if in step 2 of the SW-LFSE algorithm, node i simply uses the median value ofz
i , in the update rule (5) . Although this can reduce computation, the present approach offers a degree of freedom in choosing the weights w (j)
il [k] , that can be potentially leveraged to account for issues like noise. 8 Nevertheless, as we establish in the next section, our proposed algorithm is immune to such misbehavior.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE SW-LFSE ALGORITHM
The following is the main result of this section. Theorem 1. Given an LTI system (1) and a measurement model (2), let the baseline communication graph G be strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ Ω U (A). Furthermore, let Assumptions 1 and 2 be met. Then, the proposed SW-LFSE algorithm guarantees the following despite the actions of any set of f -local Byzantine adversaries.
• (Asymptotic Stability) Each regular node i ∈ R can asymptotically estimate the state of the plant, i.e.,
is the estimate of the state x[k] maintained by node i. 
where β (j) > 0 and γ (j) ∈ (0, 1) are certain constants.
The arguments of the proof can be used almost identically to analyze the impact of bounded communication delays (potentially random, time-varying) in the presence of adversaries, for static networks. 9 We formalize this observation below.
Corollary 1.
Given an LTI system (1) satisfying Assumption 1, and a measurement model (2), let G[k] = G ∀k, where 8 In other words, due to false time-stamp information, the quantitŷ z
may not represent the true estimate of an adversarial node l at time (k − τ il [k]). Thus, we resort to a slight abuse of notation here. 9 Here, by a bounded communication delay we imply that if (i, j) ∈ E and i, j ∈ R, then any estimate transmitted by node i to node j at time-step k, is received by node j no later than time-step k + T , for some T ∈ Z >0 .
G is strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ Ω U (A) . Furthermore, let communication delays between any pair of regular nodes in G be bounded by some T ∈ Z >0 . Then, the proposed SW-LFSE algorithm provides identical guarantees as in Theorem 1.
Remark 5. For each unstable/marginally stable eigenvalue of the system, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 explicitly relate the convergence times of the corresponding estimation errors of the different non-source nodes to the instability of the system mode under consideration, the delay upper bound T , and the respective distances of such nodes (captured by the different levels 'q' of a MEDAG) from the corresponding sources of information.
VI. SECURE STATE ESTIMATION OVER ANALOG
ERASURE CHANNELS In this section, we explore the problem of secure distributed state estimation over a network where each communication link is modeled by an analog erasure channel as defined in [24] . Specifically, the transmission of information across any link (i, j) ∈ E is governed by a random process
Furthermore, across space, the packet dropping processes over different links are independent. For any k, the random variable ξ ij [k] follows a Bernoulli fading distribution, i.e., ξ ij [k] = 0 with erasure probability p and ξ ij [k] = 1 with probability (1 − p); the implications of ξ ij [k] assuming the values 0 and 1 will be discussed shortly.
Our objective in this section will be to design a secure distributed state estimation protocol that guarantees meansquare stability of the estimation error dynamics for each regular node, in the following sense. 
A. Channels with no delay
We first consider the case where ξ ij [k] = 1 implies that any data packet transmitted by node i at time k is received perfectly by node j at time k, and when ξ ij [k] = 0, such a packet is dropped completely. For this model, we propose a simple algorithm described as follows.
For each λ j ∈ UO i , a regular node i updates its estimate of z (j) [k] in the following manner.
• At each time-step k, if it receives estimates from at least (2f +1) nodes in N (j)
i , it runs the LFSE algorithm, i.e., it removes the largest f and the smallest f estimateŝ z
where the set M The above algorithm provides the following guarantees.
Theorem 2. Given an LTI system (1) satisfying Assumption 1, and a measurement model (2) , let the baseline communication graph G be strongly (mf + 1)-robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ Ω U (A), where m ∈ Z >0 . For each (i, j) ∈ E, let ξ ij [k] be a Bernoulli packet dropping process with erasure probability p, that is i.i.d. over time and independent of packet dropping processes over other links. Suppose m ≥ 3 and that the following is true:
where ρ is the spectral radius of A, and
(10) Then, the secure distributed state estimation algorithm described by the update rules (7) and (8) guarantees meansquare stability in the sense of Definition 5, despite the actions of any f -local set of Byzantine adversaries. The termp appearing in (9) and (10) can be interpreted as the effective packet drop/erasure probability for the problem under study. With this in mind, the implications of the above result are described as follows.
Remark 6. (Increasing 'network robustness' reduces 'effective packet drop probability') Given knowledge of the spectral radius ρ of A, an upper-bound f on the number of adversaries in the neighborhood of any regular node, and the erasure probability p of the communication network, suppose we are faced with the problem of designing a network topology that guarantees mean-square stability in the sense of Definition 5. Theorem 2 provides an answer to this problem by quantitatively relating our notion of 'strong-robustness' in Definition 4 to the effective packet drop probabilityp. For instance, as shown in Figure 2 , given the parameters ρ, f and p, one can generate a plot for ρ 2p offline, and choose m to satisfy the MSS criterion ρ 2p < 1. Subsequently, one can proceed to design a network that is strongly (mf + 1)-robust w.r.t. S j , λ j ∈ Ω U (A). It is easy to verify thatp is monotonically increasing in p, and monotonically decreasing in m. In other words, for a fixed ρ and f , one can tolerate higher erasure probabilities p by increasing the robustness parameter m.
Remark 7.
Note that when f = 0, i.e., in the absence of adversaries, equation (9) reduces to ρ 2 p < 1. This condition is reminiscent of the MSS criterion for remote stabilization of an LTI system over a Bernoulli packet dropping channel [25] . This observation can be explained by viewing the contribution due to the LFSE update (7) as an analogue of the stabilizing input in the remote stabilization problem.
The requirement of m ≥ 3 in Theorem 2 is in fact necessary for the algorithm described by the update rules (7) and (8) [20] . However, m = 2 does suffice for certain variants of the analog erasure channel model, as we discuss next.
B. Channels with erasure and delay
In this section, we consider a variant of the analog erasure channel that accounts for the presence of random delays. To this end, let (i, j) ∈ E, and let v[k] be a message transmitted by node i to node j at time-step k. Then, a channel with delay and erasure causes node j to receive the following message:
where ξ ij [k] is the memory-less packet dropping process described earlier, τ ij [k] ∈ Z >0 is a random delay satisfying 1 ≤ τ ij [k] ≤ T , and T ∈ Z >0 . In other words, the channel output r[k] is either equal to the present channel input v[k] with probability (1 − e), or equal to a delayed channel input with probability e, where the delay is upper bounded by some positive constant T . It should be noted that the erasure channel model considered here is a generalization of the erasure channel with delay in [24] , where the delays are constant. For this model, we have the following result. Proposition 1. Given an LTI system (1) satisfying Assumption 1, and a measurement model (2) , let the baseline communication graph G be strongly (2f + 1)-robust w.r.t. S j , ∀λ j ∈ Ω U (A). Let each communication link of G be modeled as a channel with delay and erasure as described by equation (11) . Then, the SW-LFSE algorithm provides identical guarantees as in Theorem 1, with probability 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
We developed secure distributed state estimation algorithms that account for adversarial nodes in the presence of both deterministic and stochastic communication losses. For the former case, we characterized the convergence time of our algorithm in terms of certain system and network properties, and for the latter scenario involving analog erasure channels, we established that our notion of 'strongrobustness' plays an important role in tolerating high erasure probabilities while ensuring mean-square stability. As future work, it would be interesting to explore if exploiting sensor memory like the SW-LFSE approach in Section IV can help tolerate higher erasure probabilities for the analog erasure channel model considered in Section VI-A.
